Efficiency v. Justice: Giarratano and the Capital Petitioner\u27s Right to a Meaningful Postconviction Process by Thibodeau, Renee
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 8
Issue 1 Symposium on Capital Punishment Article 9
February 2014
Efficiency v. Justice: Giarratano and the Capital
Petitioner's Right to a Meaningful Postconviction
Process
Renee Thibodeau
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Renee Thibodeau, Efficiency v. Justice: Giarratano and the Capital Petitioner's Right to a Meaningful Postconviction Process, 8 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 399 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol8/iss1/9
EFFICIENCY v. JUSTICE: GIARRATANO AND THE





On June 23, 1989 the United States Supreme Court in Mur-
ray v. Giarratano held that indigent prisoners sentenced to death
were not entitled to state-appointed attorneys beyond their first
appeal.' By denying these defendants state-appointed representa-
tion, the Supreme Court decided that meaningful access to the
courts for the indigent ends at the close of their direct appeal.
Many would argue that this holding is in line with fostering a
more efficient judicial system; the affirmance of a defendant's
sentence on appeal should signal the end of the legal process.
Of concern, though, is the fear that by denying impoverished
capital claimants the opportunity for meaningful postconviction
review, Giarratano permits the imposition of the death penalty
without the guarantee of guilt.
This article addresses the need for counsel in capital post-
conviction proceedings beyond the first appeal. Part I discusses
the typical capital prisoner, his progress through the legal system
from trial to execution, and factors influencing the outcome of
his journey. Part II examines the constitutional basis for the
right to counsel in postconviction proceedings. Part III looks at
the case of Murray v. Giarratano, which denied counsel to capital
prisoners in state postconviction proceedings. Part IV analyzes
* B.S.N. University of Michigan (1991), J.D. University of Notre Dame
(1994). The author wishes to thank Professor John Robinson and the 1993-94
staff of the JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY for their input and
guidance. This article is dedicated to my parents whose unfailing love and
support has enabled me to achieve this and every other accomplishment to
date.
1. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). In 1979, Joe Giarratano was
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a Virginia woman and the
rape and murder of her daughter. In April 1980, the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction and sentence. Following this proceeding, Giarratano,
along with other Virginia capital petitioners, filed a class action asserting that
they had a constitutional right to attorney representation during postconviction
review. The Supreme Court ultimately decided that death row inmates were
not entitled state-appointed representation beyond their first appeal.
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Giarratano's holding in light of prior case law. Part V examines
the ramifications of Giarratano, and Part VI concludes this article.
I. THE DEATH Row INMATE - HE IS DiFFERENr
A. The Capital Petitioner
According to the American Bar Association, 99% of all death
row prisoners are impoverished.2 In Hooks v. Wainwright,3 the
district court found that 95% of the general inmate population
in custody of the Florida Correctional System were unable to
afford counsel, and 50% had a gross monthly income of under
$100 at the time they were arrested.4 Couple this indigency with
the average intelligence of a capital prisoner and the picture
grows even more grim. Over 50% of Florida's inmates are illiter-
ate with IQ's under 100.' Of those inmates falling below 100,
22% fell below eighty, which puts them in the borderline
retarded range.6 Over 50% of all inmates in the Florida Correc-
tional System read below the seventh grade level.7 The average
grade level for the typical black male offender is 6.4 (just short of
halfway through sixth grade), while the typical white male
offender does marginally better at 8.5 (halfway through eighth
grade) .8
Together, these statistics portray a fairly accurate picture of
the average death row inmate. He is impoverished, functionally
illiterate, and as generally educated as the average eleven year
old. From here we will examine his progress through our legal
system to execution.
B. The State Postconviction System: An Overview
For the most part, the road through the courts taken by the
indigent state petitioner varies only by location. Following a
bifurcated trial and sentence, the typical capital offender files for
appeal first to the state intermediate appeals court, then to the
2. Michael A. Mello, Criminal Law: Is There A Federal Constitutional Right To
Counsel In Capital Postconviction Proceedings?, 79 J. CRiM. L. 1065, 1069 n.20
(1989).
3. 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1337-38 (1982).
4. Id. at 1338.
5. Id. at 1337. An IQ of 100 is generally indicative of average intelligence.
6. Id. at 1337, 1343. An IQ from 68 to 83 is considered borderline
retarded.
7. Id. at 1337.
8. Id. at 1338.
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state supreme court.9 The state must provide the defendant with
counsel through his first appeal but not beyond this point.10
Once the appeals process has been exhausted, an inmate
may file a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. Should the Supreme Court deny his request for certiorari
or affirm his sentence, the prisoner then may initiate the state
habeas review process."1 Following state habeas review, the peti-
tioner again appeals to the state supreme court and then seeks
certiorari in the Supreme Court a second time. 2 If, after
exhausting the state system, relief has not been granted, the
defendant then may initiate the federal appeals process.
C. The Significance of the State Postconviction Process
For the capital petitioner, state habeas corpus review is often
the process which is most crucial to his case. Chief Judge Hayn-
sworth writing for the Fourth Circuit in Ross v. Moffit,13 stated, "in
the context of constitutional questions arising in criminal prose-
cutions, permissive [habeas corpus] review in the state's highest
court may be predictably the most meaningful review the convic-
tion will receive. "14
Virginia's system highlights the significance of the postcon-
viction review process. In Virginia, many claims that ordinarily
would have been heard on direct appeal are relegated to state
habeas corpus. For example, claims that counsel provided con-
stitutionally ineffective assistance at either the trial or appellate
stage may be raised only during postconviction proceedings.1 5
Should the court determine that the defendant was not ade-
quately represented, review at this stage allows new counsel to
raise claims that may have been barred on direct review due to
prior counsel's ineffective assistance. As Justice Stevens wrote in
his dissent in Giarratano, "A fresh look may reveal, for example,
that a prior conviction used to enhance the defendant's sentence
was invalid; or that the defendant's mental illness, lack of a prior
record, or abusive childhood should have been introduced as evi-
dence in mitigation at his sentencing hearing." 6
9. Lewis F. Powell, Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARv. L.REv. 1035,
1039 (1989).
10. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 1.
11. State habeas permits the defendant the opportunity to present claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel or procedural defaults during the trial stage.
12. Powell, supra note 9, at 1039.
13. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
14. Id. at 619 (citing 483 F.2d at 653).
15. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 25.
16. Id.
1994]
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The postconviction process in Virginia also provides an
opportunity to rectify procedural defaults arising during the trial
stage. Following proof of ineffective representation, the Virginia
Supreme Court will consider previously defaulted claims on a
showing that prior counsel failed to object to an error or assert a
claim at trial.17 This window of opportunity to correct defaulted
claims provides a crucial chance to rescue valid assertions that
would otherwise be barred from further review.18
Virginia postconviction proceedings are also the corner-
stone for all subsequent attempts at relief in federal court. After
a Virginia court determines a claim is barred, it may be reviewed
in federal court only upon a showing that either "there was...
cause for the default and resultant prejudice or that failure to
review will cause a fundamental miscarriage of justice."19 As Jus-
tice Stevens states, "In Virginia, therefore, postconviction pro-
ceedings are key to meaningful appellate review of cases."2"
D. Factors Influencing The "Fight"
Once the conviction and sentence are affirmed on direct
appeal, the capital petitioner in Virginia has thirty days to
respond by filing for state habeas corpus.21 The petition filed
must contain a nonfrivolous claim for relief based on the facts of
the case.22 Failure to file a meritorious claim results in dismissal
of the petition and denial of further postconviction relief. Addi-
tionally, all claims in which the facts are known to the claimant at
the time of filing must be included in the petition or they cannot
be raised in a subsequent filing, including federal habeas
corpus.
2 3
Attorney assistance in preparing the petition for relief is said
to be essential because "a court may be unable to make a fair
determination of whether a claim is meritorious on the basis of a
pleading drafted without attorney assistance." 24 Judge Scott in
Hooks v. Wainwright echoed this concern with respect to Florida's
correctional system, writing,
17. Id. at 25 n.15.
18. Id. Virginia does not allow claims that could have been raised on
direct appeal to be asserted in successive petitions.
19. Id. at 26.
20. Id. at 25, 26.
21. VA. CODE § 53.1-232 as cited in 668 F. Supp. 511, 512 (1986).
22. Id. at 514, 515.
23. Id. at 514 n.2. Federal courts may not consider claims barred by
Virginia procedural rules.
24. Raymond Y. Lin, A Prisoner's Constitutional Right To Attorney Assistance,
83 COLUM. L. RFv. 1279, 1306 (1983).
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The evidence presented in this case with respect to the
educational attainments and mental capacities of Florida's
inmates has simply served to confirm what the Court has
always suspected; that, although there are some excep-
tions, it is ludicrous to believe that Florida's prisoners are
able to conduct meaningful legal research and effectively
seek redress of their grievances without the aid of profes-
sional legal assistance.
25
In Virginia, as in Florida, the functional illiteracy of most
inmates places the ability to prepare a meaningful habeas corpus
petition beyond their capacity.26 As the Court in Powell v. Ala-
bama 7 stated, "even the intelligent and educated layman . . .
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceeding against him."28 Justice Stevens went even further in his
dissent in Giarratano when he stated that the complexity of death
penalty jurisprudence rendered it difficult for even an educated
attorney to understand. 29 Apparently, Congress has also recog-
nized the complexity of a habeas corpus proceeding. The 1988
Anti-Drug Abuse Act requires that counsel be provided for all
capital prisoners convicted of drug offenses who seek federal
postconviction relief.3 0
In addition to the complexity and time constraints associ-
ated with state habeas corpus, the death row inmate drafting his
petition must deal with the overwhelming task of preparing to
die. The District Court in Giarratano best summarized the emo-
tional inability of a capital petitioner to prepare a viable postcon-
viction petition. Judge Merhige stated,
At the time the inmate is required to rapidly perform the
complex and difficult work necessary to file a timely peti-
tion, he is the least capable of doing so. The evidence gives
rise to a fair inference that an inmate preparing himself
and his family for impending death is incapable of per-
forming the mental functions necessary to adequately pur-
sue his claim.31
The tremendous challenge, both intellectually and emotion-
ally, that the postconviction process presents to the capital peti-
tioner seems evident. Although the barriers to effective pro se
25. Hooks, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
26. Lin, supra note 24, at 1306.
27. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
28. Id. at 69.
29. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 27.
30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(q) (4) (B) as cited in Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 19.
31. Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1986).
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representation stand out plainly, constitutional justification for
state-provided counsel must exist before it can be mandated as a
federal constitutional requirement.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR REPRESENTATION
The Supreme Court has a long history of supporting the
rights of indigent prisoners on appeal. In Griffin v. Illinois,32 the
Court invalidated an Illinois rule that foreclosed a convicted
defendant from bringing an appeal if he could not afford to pay
for a transcript of his trial. The Illinois rule stated that a con-
victed person could present his claims of trial error only if on
appeal he produced a transcript of his trial.33 Unfortunately, the
rule did not provide a transcript for those unable to pay for one.
The Court found this financial barrier to an appeal unaccept-
able, and invalidated the rule.
Subsequent cases followed the theme of Giffin by further
breaking down financial barriers to the appellate system. In
Douglas v. California, 4 the Court examined a prisoner's realistic
ability to access the appellate system without attorney assistance.
The Court held that simply providing a prisoner with a transcript
did not fulfill a state's obligation to insure equal access to the
appellate process. To provide prisoners with a genuine opportu-
nity to appeal their conviction, the Court held that states were
required to provide indigent prisoners with counsel on their first
appeal of right.3"
The cases beyond Douglas represent a marked departure
from the Court's previous consistent policy of eradicating finan-
cial barriers to the judicial system. In a series of cases that when
taken together are virtually irreconcilable, the Court evidences
its difficulty with formulating a consistent policy regarding pris-
oner access to the state postconviction process.
In Ross v. Moffit,3" the Court was faced for the first time with
the issue of an indigent prisoner's right to representation during
appeals following his first appeal of right. Although not a death
penalty case, the issues presented in Ross were identical to those
that would be evaluated fifteen years later in Giarratano. Justice
Rehnquist began his opinion in Ross by discussing previous case
law eliminating financial barriers to court access. He stated,
"The decisions discussed above stand for the proposition that a
32. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
33. Id. at 13 n.2.
34. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
35. Id. at 356.
36. Ross, 417 U.S. at 600.
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State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while
leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons."37 jus-
tice Rehnquist explained that the rationale behind the Giffin
and Douglas line of cases stemmed from a combination of both
Equal Protection and Due Process rights. To exemplify this
rationale he referenced the opinion of the Court of Appeals
which stated,
There simply cannot be due process of the law to a litigant
deprived of all professional assistance when other litigants,
similarly situated, are able to obtain professional assistance
and to be benefitted by it. The same concepts of fairness
and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of
right require counsel in other and subsequent discretion-
ary appeals.3"
Justice Rehnquist then evaluated the issue in Ross in light of both
the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses and, unlike the
Court of Appeals, concluded that neither one required North
Carolina to provide counsel for defendants in discretionary
appeals to the State Supreme Court.
Beginning his analysis with the Due Process clause, Justice
Rehnquist explained that the function of due process was to
insure fairness between the State and the individual confronting
the State.3 9 At the trial stage, the State initiates the adversary
system to convert a person presumed innocent into a person
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Due Process in that setting
requires that the State provide counsel for a defendant "as a
shield to protect him against being 'haled into court' by the State
"140and stripped of his presumption of innocence....
In contrast, on appeal the defendant initiates the adversary
process. In this situation, Justice Rehnquist found that Due Pro-
cess did not require States to provide prisoners with representa-
tion. He explained that the role of the attorney on appeal was
not to provide the defendant with a "shield" but with a "sword" to
overturn his prior conviction. According to Justice Rehnquist,
because a State was under no obligation to provide an appeal,
when one was provided it did not automatically follow that coun-
sel must be provided as well. 4 ' Justice Rehnquist explained that
denying a defendant counsel at this stage was not a denial of Due
Process because petitioners were not being treated unfairly.
37. Id. at 607.
38. Ross, 417 U.S. at 609 n.8 (citing 483 F.2d at 665).
39. Ross, 417 U.S. at 608.
40. Id. at 611.
41. Id.
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Unfairness, he stated, "results only if indigents are singled out by
the State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system
because of their poverty."42
Justice Rehnquist then evaluated the issue of counsel provi-
sion in light of the Equal Protection clause. Equal Protection
requires that States not maintain unreasoned distinctions
between arguably indistinguishable classes of people. He
explained, "The State cannot adopt procedures which leave an
indigent defendant entirely cut off from any appeal at all by vir-
tue of his indigency, or extend to such indigent defendants
merely a meaningless ritual while others in better economic cir-
cumstances have a meaningful appeal."4" But Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that the question was one of degrees, not absolutes.
The state appellate system must be free of unreasoned distinc-
tions, but did not require "absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages."44
In the end Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Equal Pro-
tection clause did not require North Carolina to provide indi-
gents with counsel for discretionary appeals such as state habeas
corpus. Although "a skilled lawyer, particularly one trained in
the somewhat arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary
review"45 might be helpful, Justice Rehnquist explained that the
handicap presented by the attorney's absence in this situation
was far less than it would be if an indigent was denied counsel on
his first appeal of right.46 He recounted that the State's duty was
to insure the convicted defendant has "an adequate opportunity
to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate
process."47 The State was not required to duplicate the arsenal of
forces a wealthy prisoner could marshal in the effort to reverse
his conviction.
Justice Rehnquist found that the system as it existed fulfilled
the obligation North Carolina owed its prisoners under the Con-
stitution. He concluded that the "respondent was denied no
right secured by the Federal Constitution when North Carolina
refused to provide counsel to aid him in obtaining discretionary
appellate review."4"
42. Id.
43. Id. at 612.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 616.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 619.
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In the subsequent case of Bounds v. Smith49 the Court again
addressed the rights of indigent prisoners on appeal. Here the
Court confronted the issue of whether States were required to
provide indigent prisoners with law libraries or alternative
sources of legal knowledge to protect their right of access to the
courts. Reaffirming the importance of a "meaningful appeal"
brought out by Justice Rehnquist in Ross, the Court answered its
inquiry in the affirmative. Writing for the Majority, Justice Mar-
shall explained that ". . . recent decisions have struck down
restrictions and required remedial measures to insure that
inmate access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaning-
ful."" ° He recounted that this holding was in keeping with the
Court's demonstrated high regard for postconviction proceed-
ings. Justice Marshall continued, "As this court has 'constantly
emphasized', habeas corpus and civil rights actions are of 'funda-
mental importance . . . in our constitutional scheme' because
they directly protect our most valued rights."
5 1
Justice Marshall rebuffed the argument that under the Con-
stitution a State's only duty was to prevent a prisoner's right of
access to the court system from being compromised. Instead, he
stated, ". . . our decisions have consistently required States to
shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful
access to the courts."52 Although he recognized that a petition
for habeas corpus only required setting forth the facts that gave
rise to the cause of action, Justice Marshall insisted that, ". . . a
lawyer must know what the law is in order to determine whether
a colorable claim exists, and if so what facts are necessary to state
a cause of action. If a lawyer must perform such preliminary
research, it is no less vital for a pro se petitioner. '53 Lastly, Jus-
tice Marshall addressed the financial concerns presented by the
State. He concluded,
The cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify
its total denial... The inquiry is rather whether law librar-
ies or other forms of legal assistance are needed to give
prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to
the courts.
5 4
49. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
50. Id. at 822.
51. Id. at 827.
52. Id. at 824.
53. Id. at 825.
54. Id.
19941
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Pennsylvania v. FinleJ5 was the next case to consider the
issue of State-provided counsel for indigents engaging in discre-
tionary appeals. The issue before the Court involved the applica-
bility of the Anders procedures56 to collateral postconviction
proceedings. The Court found these procedures inapplicable to
collateral appeals because petitioners did not have the right to
counsel required before these procedures could apply. Writing
for the Court, Justice Rehnquist stated, "We have never held that
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting
collateral attacks upon their convictions, and we decline to so
hold today."57 As in Ross, Justice Rehnquist evaluated the issue of
counsel provision in light of both the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection clauses. With reference to Due ProcessJustice Rehnquist
explained, "States have no obligation to provide postconviction
relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by
the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply a
lawyer as well.""
He then addressed the "meaningful access" concerns
presented under the Equal Protection clause. Specifically refer-
encing his opinion in Ross, he stated,
In Ross we concluded that the defendant's access to the
trial record and appellate briefs and opinions provided suf-
ficient tools for the pro se litigant to gain meaningful access
to courts that possess a discretionary power of review. We
think the same conclusion necessarily obtains with respect
to postconviction review.59
III. GIARRA TANO
A. The District Court
In Murray v. Giarratano6 ° the issue was whether the state is
required to provide prisoners sentenced to death with counsel
during postconviction proceedings. Relying on the "meaningful
access" language of Bounds, the district court held that prisoners
sentenced to death in Virginia who requested counsel in state
55. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
56. Id. at 554. These procedures provide a framework of operation for
counsel wishing to withdraw from an appeal on the grounds that the case is
frivolous.
57. Id. at 555.
58. Id. at 556.
59. Id. at 557.
60. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
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habeas corpus proceedings could have an attorney appointed if
they could not afford to independently retain one.6'
This ruling expanded Bounds, which held that states were
obligated to provide prisoners with either adequate law libraries
or some other form of trained legal assistance to assist with the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal documents.6" The
district court in Giarratano expanded Bounds because it found the
Bounds premise invalid with respect to Virginia inmates. In
Bounds the Court assumed that the inmates would be capable of
using law libraries to develop legitimate claims. 63 But in Giar-
ratano, the district court found that the evidence indicated three
reasons why this presumption did not hold up with regard to the
Virginia prison population.
First, capital petitioners in Virginia have thirty days from the
affirmance of their sentence in which to prepare and submit
their writ of habeas corpus. Given the highly restrictive time
period, the court found that it was unreasonable to presume that
inmates could mount a valid attack absent legal assistance. 64 Sec-
ond, the court found that the complexity and difficulty of the
legal work was beyond the ability of most capital petitioners.
Third, the court determined that the emotional constraints on
an inmate preparing for death rendered him incapable of per-
forming the complex work required in the compressed time
period. Based on these considerations, the court concluded that
only the continuous services of an attorney would accord capital
petitioners "meaningful access."65
The district court's holding that only continuous assistance
of counsel would satisfy the "meaningful access" requirement of
Bounds resulted from an in-depth analysis of the types of assist-
ance Virginia death row inmates were already provided. Two
forms of trained legal assistance were available in Virginia at the
time Giarratano was decided.
First, attorneys were assigned to the various penal institu-
tions to assist inmates "in any matter related to incarceration. '"66
At the time Giarratano was decided seven institutional attorneys
were assigned to meet the legal needs of over two thousand pris-
oners and not one attorney had helped prepare the habeas
corpus petition of a capital petitioner.67 The evidence at trial
61. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 517.
62. Id. at 512.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 514.
66. Id. at 513.
67. Id.
1994]
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indicated that the these attorneys operated as "talking law-
books"6 8 and could not possibly meet the needs of a death row
inmate.
The second form of assistance provided by Virginia granted
free counsel to inmates who had been residents for a continuous
period of six months and who had previously filed a petition con-
taining at least one nonfrivolous claim. 69 Because prisoners were
not receiving the assistance of the institutional attorneys when
preparing their petitions, the probability of raising a nonfrivo-
lous claim was extremely slim. Couple this with the fact that Vir-
ginia law stated that all claims known to the petitioner at the time
of filing must be included in the petition or they may not be
raised in a subsequent filing, and the inadequacy of the Virginia
legal assistance system was apparent.
The district court concluded that the timing of counsel
appointment was the primary problem with the Virginia system.
By the time counsel was appointed, the inmate must already have
submitted a petition containing all possible nonfrivolous claims.
Therefore, he did not receive the assistance of counsel during
the critical period of claim development.70 The court summa-
rized by stating that Virginia's pre-petition legal assistance pro-
gram was too limited, while post-petition assistance was
untimely.7 Due to these limitations, Virginia's district court
held that continuous assistance of counsel was required to truly
give credence to the "meaningful access" mandate of Bounds.
B. The Appeals
On appeal, Giarratano was reversed by a panel of the Fourth
Circuit with regard to providing counsel in state habeas corpus
proceedings. Relying heavily on Finley (decided subsequent to
the district court's ruling) the court concluded that the district
court's extension of Bounds to mandate attorney representation
for capital petitioners was constitutionally insupportable.72
But on reconsideration en banc, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the panel decision and affirmed the district court. Unlike the
panel, which refused to distinguish Finley on the ground that the
case did not involve the death penalty, the en banc court found
this distinction extremely significant. The court correctly
pointed out that Finley did not involve "meaningful access" as dis-
68. Id. at 514.
69. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 514, 515.
70. Id. at 515.
71. Id.
72. Giarratano, 836 F.2d 1421, 1423 (4th Cir. 1988).
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cussed in Ross and expanded on in Bounds. But the most impor-
tant difference between Finley and Giarratano was that Finley was
not a death penalty case. 7'3 The court stated,
Because of the peculiar nature of the death penalty,
we find it difficult to envision any situation in which
appointed counsel would not be required in state
post[-] conviction proceedings when a prisoner under the
sentence of death could not afford an attorney.
7 4
C. The Supreme Court
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth
Circuit was reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist
stated, "In Finley we ruled that neither the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Equal Protection guarantee
of 'meaningful access' required the State to appoint counsel for
indigent prisoners seeking state postconviction. relief."75 The
Court's opinion in Giarratano effectively affirmed the holding in
Finley, although the rationale for the Court's holding in Giar-
ratano differed slightly.
Initially, Justice Rehnquist addressed the defendants' first
argument - that "the Constitution requires postconviction cases
involving the death penalty to be treated differently from other
postconviction cases."76 Defendants argued that Finley was not
dispositive of the issue of the respondents' right to counsel in
habeas proceedings because Finley did not involve the death pen-
alty. Along the same lines, defendants' stated that Due Process
required that counsel be provided in postconviction proceedings
"because of the nature of the punishment and the need for
accuracy."
77
Justice Rehnquist began his opinion by agreeing with the
respondents in their contention that "death was different." He
stated, "We have recognized on more than one occasion that the
Constitution places special constraints on the procedures used to
convict an accused of a capital offense and sentence him to death
... [t] he finality of the death penalty requires 'a greater degree of
reliability' when it is imposed. '78 Justice Rehnquist then distin-
guished prior case law from the issue in Giarratano by explaining
that the holdings to which he referred all dealt with the trial
73. Giarratano, 847 F.2d 1118, 1121 (1988).
74. Id. at 1122 n.8.
75. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 10.
76. Id. at 12 n.4.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id.
19941
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stage of adjudication. He noted, "State collateral proceedings
are not constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state crimi-
nal proceedings and serve a different and more limited purpose
than either the trial or appeal."7 9 Justice Rehnquist explained
that at the trial stage, the safeguards provided by the Eighth
Amendment assured the reliability of process by which the death
penalty was imposed. Therefore, he concluded that Finley
applied no differently in capital cases than it did in noncapital
cases.
80
Justice Rehnquist went on to address the other basis for the
Fourth Circuit's en banc holding - the perceived tension
between Finley's holding and the implications of Bounds. He
stated that in reality no such tension existed because Finley was
decided subsequent to Bounds. He recounted, ". . . it would be a
strange jurisprudence that permitted the extension of that
[Bounds] holding to partially overrule a subsequently decided
case such as Finley which held that prisoners seeking judicial
relief from their sentence in state proceedings were not entitled
to counsel."" To dispel any remaining confusion, Justice Rehn-
quist concluded by stating, ".... we now hold that Finley applies to
those inmates under sentence of death as well as to other
inmates, and that holding necessarily imposes limits on
Bounds."82
VI. GIARRATANO ANALYsis: THE PAST SET THE STAGE
As should be apparent, an enormous amount of tension
exists between the holdings of Ross, Bounds, Finley and Giarratano.
Much of this disparity can be accounted for by taking note of the
changing composition of the Court over the period in which
these cases were decided. In Ross, the Majority consisted of Jus-
tices Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun and Powell.
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented. In contrast
the Bounds Majority consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Powell, and White with Justices Rehnquist, Burger
and Stewart dissenting. By Finley, the Majority consisted of Jus-
tices Rehnquist, White, Powell, Blackmun, O'Connor and Scalia
with Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissenting.
Throughout this time period Justices Marshall and Brennan
remained committed to expanding the rights of indigent defend-
ants while Justices Rehnquist remained committed to restricting
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 19.
82. Id. at 19, 20.
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them. The outcomes of these cases reflect the shifts in the Court
Majority from conservative to liberal and then back to conserva-
tive where it remains today. Therefore, the holding in Giarratano
comes as no surprise given Court's current composition. What is
surprising is that the holding was a plurality,"3 not a majority,
which may signal the possibility of expanded indigent rights in
the future.
The Supreme Court's holding in Giarratano represents the
most successful attempt to date by Justice Rehnquist to increase
judicial efficiency. But given the tension between Ross, Bounds,
and Finley, one wonders how long Justice Rehnquist's reign will
last.
A. Ross
The Court in Ross held that prisoners were not entitled to
counsel beyond the first appeal of right. In his opinion, Justice
Rehnquist outlined the meaning of both the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses, and found that neither provided a basis
for postconviction provision of counsel. With reference to Due
Process he stated, ". . . Unfairness results only if indigents are
singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to the
appellate system because of their poverty."84 In his Equal Protec-
tion analysis Justice Rehnquist explained, "The State cannot...
extend to such indigent defendants merely a meaningless ritual
while others in better economic circumstances have meaningful
appeal."85 He concluded that neither unfairness nor a meaning-
less ritual results when an indigent defendant is denied represen-
tation on discretionary appeal. Lack of attorney assistance
merely meant that the petitioner was "somewhat handicapped in
comparison with a wealthy defendant who has counsel assisting
him in every conceivable manner at every stage in the proceed-
ing."" Further,Justice Rehnquist explained, this "handicap" was
".... far less than the handicap borne by the indigent defendant
denied counsel on his initial appeal of right in Douglas."
7
As Justice Rehnquist stated, petitioners denied state-
appointed counsel on collateral review are less compromised that
they would be were counsel on direct appeal denied. The ques-
83. Justice White, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy
concurred with ChiefJustice Rehnquist in reversing the en banc decision of the
Fourth Circuit. Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and Justice
Blackmun dissented.
84. Ross, 417 U.S. at 611.
85. Id. at 612.
86. Id. at 615.
87. Id.
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tion, though, should not concern the greater degree of disadvan-
tage petitioners would endure in the absence of counsel on
direct appeal. Rather, it seems Justice Rehnquist's analysis
should have focused on whether it is fundamentally fair to allow
indigent petitioners to proceed through state-provided appeals
without appointed representation.
The State, just as a wealthy defendant, comes to court with
"counsel assisting... in every conceivable manner at every stage
in the proceeding.""8 To rationalize that the inequity borne of
such an unbalanced confrontation is merely a "handicap" which
is "far less" than that borne of a defendant denied counsel on his
first appeal seems to ignore the issue at hand; namely that of
insuring that the entire appellate process is "fundamentally fair."
This concern was echoed by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Ross.
He stated,
Douglas v. California was grounded on concepts of fairness
and equality. The right to seek discretionary review is a
substantial one, and one where a lawyer can be of signifi-
cant assistance to an indigent defendant. It was correctly
perceived below that the "same concepts of fairness and
equality which require counsel in a first appeal of right,
require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary
appeals."89
Denying counsel to this class of petitioner denies him the
ability "to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's
appellate process."9" Admittedly, financial differences between
classes of defendants exist that cannot be equalized by the courts
or the legislatures. But non-representation on appeal should not
be a cross indigent defendants alone must bear merely because
they are indigent.
B. Bounds Dissent
The Court in Bounds held that states were required to pro-
vide indigent prisoners with access to the courts that is "ade-
quate, effective and meaningful"9 1 by providing them with law
libraries or alternative sources of legal assistance. This holding
was a clear move by the Court to eliminate financial barriers that
denied prisoners their "fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts."9 2 Justice Rehnquist, though, disagreed with
88. Id. at 611.
89. Id. at 620.
90. Id. at 616.
91. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822.
92. Id. at 828.
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the Majority and his dissent signaled the path the Court would
take in the future. He stated,
[I]f a prisoner incarcerated pursuant to a final judgement
of conviction is not prevented from physical access to the
federal courts... he has been accorded the only constitu-
tional right of access to the courts that our cases have
articulated in a reasoned way.
9 3
Despite his heated disagreement with the Majority's holding
in Bounds, Justice Rehnquist admitted that state-appointed repre-
sentation for prisoners seeking collateral review was "the logical
destination of the Court's reasoning today." 4 But when the
opportunity to extend Bounds arose in Finley, he made it clear
that the Court's future direction would not include requiring
states to provide attorneys for indigent petitioners engaged in
discretionary appeals.
C. Finley
With frequent reference to Ross, Justice Rehnquist wrote the
opinion for the Finley Majority, stating, "We have never held that
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting
collateral attacks upon their convictions, and we decline to so
hold today."9 5 His opinion concluded with the statement, "States
have no obligation to provide postconviction relief, and when
they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process
Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well."9 6
In light of the language used by Justice Rehnquist in Finley,
the holding in Giarratano seems little more than a foregone con-
clusion. Although Finley did not involve the death penalty, and
did not have an indigent's right to counsel at issue, its holding
clearly would govern subsequent cases. Justice Rehnquist's
eagerness to address the issue of state-appointed counsel was
apparent, and signaled that the Court would continue to travel
the narrow path Ross began.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF GZARuRi TANO
Instead of extending Bounds to allow counsel to be provided
to indigents in post-conviction proceedings, the Court in Giar-
ratano chose to limit meaningful access to the judicial system to,
93. Id. at 840.
94. Id.
95. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555.
96. Id. at 556.
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at best, five percent of all inmates.97 The words of Justice Mar-
shall in Bounds, "... the cost of protecting a constitutional right
cannot justify its total denial,"9" had obviously fallen on deaf ears.
In her concurrence Justice O'Connor alludes to the substan-
tive issue behind the Giarratano decision. She states, "Beyond the
requirements of Bounds, the matter is one of... the allocation of
scarce legal resources."99 (emphasis added). The Court reduced the
issue of attorney representation for a person sentenced to die to
a question of fiscal prudence, despite the truth uncovered by the
Douglas Court thirty years ago; "There can be no equal justice
where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the
amount of money he has."1
00
Although the fiscal ramifications of providing state-
appointed attorneys do merit some consideration, as the district
court in Giarratano stated, ". . . the cost of protecting a constitu-
tional right cannot in itself be dispositive."' 0 ' Even when the
financial ramifications of providing counsel on discretionary
appeals are evaluated, they fail to indicate that counsel should be
denied.
The district court in Giarratano noted that the system already
present in Virginia appointed counsel to inmates who were able
to file habeas corpus petitions containing non-frivolous claims.
Because of this fact, the court found that the added cost of pro-
viding attorneys for inmates who request them prior to filing
their petitions "should not impose an onerous burden on the
Commonwealth." 0 2 Consequently, the court concluded that,
"[t]he stakes are simply too high for this Court not to grant, at
least in part, some relief."'0 3
In writing for the Majority in Giarratano, Justice Rehnquist
clearly took a stand contrary to that of the district court. Fiscal
concerns, although not articulated until Justice O'Connor's con-
currence, were unquestionably at the forefront of the Court's
consideration. The result of not requiring legal assistance dur-
ing postconviction proceedings for indigent capital petitioners
will be swift judicial review. Unfortunately, a substantial risk of
97. In Hooks v. Wainwright, the district court found that 95% of the
general inmate population in custody of the Florida Correctional System were
unable to afford counsel. 536 F. Supp. at 1338.
98. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824.
99. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 12.
100. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
101. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 516 n.3.
102. Id. at 515.
103. Id.
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error also accompanies the expedience sought by the Giarratano
Court.
A commission on federal habeas corpus cases chaired byJus-
tice Lewis Powell issued the statement, "Because, as a practical
matter, the focus of review in capital cases often shifts to collat-
eral proceedings, the lack of adequate counsel creates severe
problems."1"4 Justice Stewart, dissenting in Bounds, stated that in
over twenty years of adjudicating pro se habeas corpus petitions
he has found that law libraries rarely provide prison inmates with
"meaningful access" to the federal courts.1 05 Giarratano does pro-
mote judicial efficiency, but the price paid for it may be substan-
tially higher than anticipated.
But the most disturbing finding on review of the Giarratano
case may be the proposition made by Justice Rehnquist that Finley
should apply equally to capital and noncapital cases. 0 6 The
opinions of the lower courts in the Giarratano case alone accord
credence to the argument that death penalty jurisprudence calls
for a different standard of review in death penalty cases. Giar-
ratano was a plurality,' 0 7 not a majority, and the primary issue
that set the Justices apart was the fact that the petitioner was sen-
tenced to death.
This disparity between the Justices arises from well-founded
concerns that death penalty cases should be evaluated differ-
ently. Historically, case law involving the death penalty has been
anything but clearly affirmative of the compulsory application of
noncapital holdings to capital cases. Time and again, courts have
distinguished death. In Woodson v. North Carolina the Court
stated that death was "quantitatively" different from prison, no
matter what the length of incarceration happened to be.108 Jus-
tice O'Connor, in California v. Ramos, observed that the Court
recognized a "qualitative" difference between death and other
punishments. 0 9 But the district court in Giarratano may have
expressed the difference best, stating,
The matter of a death row inmate's habeas corpus petition
is too important - both to society, which has a compelling
interest in insuring that a sentence of death has been con-
stitutionally imposed, as well as to the individual involved
104. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., AD Hoc COMM. ON FED. HABEAS
CoRPuus IN CAPITAL CASES, COMMITrEE REPORT AND PROPOSAL 4 (1989).
105. 430 U.S. at 836.
106. 492 U.S. at 9.
107. See supra note 83.
108. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
109. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
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- to leave to, what is at best, a patchwork system of
assistance."110
In sum, only one argument needs to be made: due process
of law requires counsel in postconviction proceedings involving
the death penalty. Justice Stevens focused his entire dissent in
Giarratano's on the fundamental unfairness inherent in forcing a
capital petitioner to initiate postconviction appeals "without
counsel's guiding hand.""' First, he cited the fundamental dif-
ference between Finley and Giarratano. "These respondents, like
petitioners in Powell but unlike respondent in Finley, have been
condemned to die."
112
Second, Justice Stevens addressed the difference between
the collateral process at work in Finley and the one present in
Virginia. As previously discussed,"' in Virginia claims usually
heard on direct review are adjudicated in postconviction pro-
ceedings. These postconviction proceedings often provide the
first opportunity for the defendant to raise allegations that trial
or appellate counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assist-
ance. More importantly, Virginia's postconviction process is the
first place that claims barred by prior counsel's ineffective assist-
ance may be raised.
Last, Justice Stevens cited the difference between death row
inmates and others in the prison population. Finley, he said, does
not accurately reflect the plight of the death row inmate.
Although the system may force an ordinary prisoner to mount
his own postconviction attacks, the capital petitioner is in a dif-
ferent position. The complexity of this specialized area of the
law requires the assistance of an attorney.1 4
Justice Stevens wrapped up his accurate dissent with the ele-
gant, pointed conclusion, "Simple fairness requires that this judg-
ment be affirmed."' 15
VI. CONCLUSION
By denying capital petitioners stated-appointed counsel
beyond their first appeal, the Supreme Court advances the
admittedly important goal ofjudicial efficiency. But the question
remains, at what cost? Every evaluation undertaken by the
Supreme Court must address jurisprudential concerns as well as
110. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 515.
111. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 19.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 25.
114. Id. at 27-28.
115. Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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pragmatic considerations. An evaluation which fails to attribute
weight to either side risks advancing a societal norm contrary to
the foundation on which our country was based. Giarratano
erects a substantial barrier to postconviction access for the indi-
gent capital petitioner, and the caseloads of state and federal
courts across the country will be lighter as a result. But the likeli-
hood ofjudicial inaccuracy in death penalty cases will be greater.
If the price of potentially fatal inaccuracies was worth a faster
system, the Court reached the right decision.

